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Introduction 
The United States is an influential superpower with military, political and economic 
prominence throughout the world. Since the Spanish American War of 1898, the US has been the 
hegemonic power in the western hemisphere. Because of its strong influence, US military 
involvement in other countries is highly scrutinized both internationally and domestically. 
During the Cold War, the US perceived that Latin America had a weakness towards communism. 
Therefore, US military interventions were justified as actions for preventing conununism and for 
promoting democracy. Intervention used to further US objectives can be military actions, 
economic trade or coercive diplomacy, such as when the US threatens to suspend economic 
assistance to its poorer allies. Is US intervention effective in promoting democratic practices in 
Latin American governments? 
Latin American nations have not had much international power or influence; 
nevertheless, they have been subject to many US interventions. Why, then, has the US bothered 
to intervene in the political systems of small, generally poor countries in Latin America? 
According to Paul Drake, in the 20th century, US attitudes of etlmocentrism and racism 
influenced the decision to intervene in "weaker, darker, poorer countries" (Lowenthall991, 7). 
Essentially, the perceptions ofthe US ofthe people of Latin America were viewed as not being 
able to govern themselves and needed the guidance of the US. Also, in what the US refers to as 
"American's backyard", the Caribbean Basin holds US strategic and economic advantages that 
improve US security. 
From 1948 to the end ofthe Cold War against the communist Soviet Union in 1990, the 
US put more focus on its national security, acting on the alleged threats of communism in Latin 
America. The US accomplished this by removing presidents who were susceptible to 
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communism and by supporting authoritarian regimes that were anti-communist. '1l1ough the main 
purpose was to contain communism, many interventions were justified as also promoting 
democracy in the Western Hemisphere. 
Generally, US interventions in Latin America have been primarily motivated by US 
national security needs. The possibility of Soviet nuclear weapons, troops and bases in close 
proximity of the US mainland would have been detrimental to the safety and protection of the 
US and its citizens. Armed conflict and the deployment of military persolUlel arc generally, 
unpopular among the people of the US. A positive justification by US leaders, such as promoting 
democracy, builds support within their constituencies. Does US military intervention and 
coercive diplomacy actually result in the establishment of stable Latin American democracies, or 
is national security the only aim of US action? 
Democracy is more than holding elections to elect government officials. To have a true 
democracy, all constituents must have the opportunity to vote, run for office and voice their own 
opinions without the fear of retribution (Smith 2005, 8). Also, those who were elected to power 
must peacefully relinquish their positions when the time comes. 
When it comes to promoting democracy abroad, US officials see themselves as "the 
guardians and promoters of a set of moral principles" (Herrick and McRae 2003, 2). Such moral 
pri nciples referred to by Herrick and McRae are the promotion of democracy and respect for the 
law. When those without our morals and values come into a position of power threatening our 
own, the US is motivated to intervene. Although US intervention is to protect US interests and 
national security, it is also a quest to promote democracy. 
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My hypothesis is that US intervention is elTective in promoting democratic practices in 
Latin American goverrunents. Types of intervention for this study are direct military intervention 
and indirect intervention as was the case in Nicaragua. 
The Dominican Republic (1965), Panama (1989) and Nicaragua (1979) will be used to 
test my hypothesis. These particular countries were chosen because of US president's statements 
citing the need to promote democracy and to gain an understanding of US foreign policy in the 
region. The government prior to the intervention and 12 years after the invention will be 
analyzed. The core stated goals of US foreign policy will be examined and why the spread of 
democracy is beneficial to the US as stated by US foreign policy makers. Although the US has 
intervened in Latin America in many different ways, through this research, I hope to gain an 
understanding if military intervention is an effective way of promoting democracy. 
Literature Review 
According to Dinorah Azpuru and Carolyn M. Shaw, the relationship between the US 
and Latin American prior to 1948 was mainly based on economic benefits for the US (Azpuru 
and Shaw 2010, 253). Democratic promotion was not a high priority and the US supported 
authoritarian governments if it was in the best of interests of national security (Azpuru and Shaw 
2020, 253). As a capitalist nation, the US is interested in promoting its domestic business and 
foreign trade. The financial prosperity of the US is vital for maintaining its dominant position in 
the world. And US trade with Latin America, from an economic perspective, can be mutually 
beneficial. Free trade between the US and Latin America secures markets by giving both 
countries a common interest in each other's success. According to the authors, democracy is 
promoted in Latin America through trade with the United States because it encourages 
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individuals to succeed, businesses to thrive, and empowers employees economically with good 
jobs. 
In Understanding Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion and Change, Jolm A. 
Booth, Christine J. Wade, and Thomas W. Walker write that U.S. national security became a 
priority in I.atin America during the Cold War (2006, 177). The US was concerned that the 
Soviet Union would spread conununism and extend their influence into Latin America, curtailing 
U.S. control in their own backyard. According to Booth, Wade and Walker, national security 
and stopping the spread of communism "was the major force driving U.S. policy'' during the 
Cold War with the Soviet Union (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006, 178). This strategy was 
known as containment. The main purpose of containment was to stop the spread of Latin 
American governments supporting the Soviet Union. According to the authors, it wasn't until 
after the Cold War and the perceived threat of communism diminished that the US was interested 
in promoting democracy in Latin America (Booth, Wade and Walker 2006, 202). 
According to Peter H. Smith, In Talons ofthe Eagle: Dynamics of U.S. -Latin American 
relations, it is the political mission of the US to spread democracy throughout the world (Smith 
2000, 38). Smith contends that throughout history "imperial powers justified their actions in 
terms of a higher mission'' (Smith 2000, 39). US imperialism and interventions in Latin America 
were justified as promoting the spread of democracy (Smith 2000, 38). More democratic 
governments in the Western Hemisphere would increase the likelihood of success for US foreign 
policy goals. If there is a worthy purpose, such as the principle of democracy, the use of military 
intervention or coercive diplomacy is more acceptable to members of congress and the US 
general population. 
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In The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Samuel P. 
Huntington contends that three waves of democratization have occurred in the world ( 1991, 15). 
Huntington states that democratization involves: 1 ): the end of an authoritarian regime 2): the 
installation of a democratic regime and 3): the consolidation of the democratic regime 
(Huntington 1991, 3 5). The first two waves of democratization were followed by a reverse wave, 
in which the countries that had previously transitioned to a democratic government reve1tcd back 
to nondemocratic rule (Huntington 1991, 16). 
US victories in World War II provided opportunities to increase American global influence, 
and focus US interests on national security. Also, after battling a totalitarian superpower, 
American policy makers could see the definite need to promote democracy and other American 
ideals worldwide. 
Scholars such as, Scan M. Lynn·Jones argues the spread of democracy is beneficia] to the US 
for the following reasons (Lynn-Jones 1998, 9): 
1. Democracies will not go to war with the United States. 
Known as the democratic peace theory, the concept promotes the idea that democracies 
never (or rarely) go to war with each other (Layne 1994, 8). This does not mean that democracies 
do not go to war at all, but democracies do not threaten or fight other democratic regimes. The 
more democratic regimes worldwide, the fewer conflicts the US will have to engage in. 
Therefore, enhancing the national security of the US and creating a more peaceful world. 
2. Democracies don't support terrorism against the United States. 
5 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City 
and Pentagon in Washington D.C. brought a new sense of insecurity to the US. Then US 
President George H.W. Bush initiated a global war on terrorism and against those who wanted to 
harm 1he US and US allies (Smith 2005, 341). Lynn-Jones contends terrorists often come from 
authoritarian regimes and not democracies. Authoritarian regimes arc severely limited in political 
participation. These organizations combined with poverty, unemployment and anti- US 
ideologies, produce the perfect govemment for terrorists. For that reason, the spread of 
democracy affects US national security by minimizing the number of terrorists in authoritarian 
regimes. 
3. Democracies produce fewer refugees. 
Thousands of refugees escaping from political oppression, ethnic or religious conflicts 
often flee to the US in search of a more stable and secure life. For example, many Cubans risk 
their lives each year to escape poverty and oppression imposed by Dictator fidel Castro. Lynn-
Jones argues that the more democracies world-wide, the number of refugees that immigrate to 
the US will be reduced (1998, 9). 
4. Democracies wm ally with the United States. 
The international spread of democracies promotes American interests by creating more 
allies ior the US (1998, 9). Even though the US has a strong military, in times of war, allies are 
able to provide the US with strategic, military and economic support. In return, allies also gain 
invaluable military, foreign assistance and trade support of the US. 
5. American ideals flourish when others adopt them. 
6 
The US has a genuine interest in seeing its ideals spread. Lynn-Jones argues that the 
advantages of American ideals spreading is that the American democracy "will be healthier 
when other nations adopt similar political systems" (1998, 9). As the US promotes democracy in 
other nations, the US has a sense of self-satisfaction of being able to spread its democratic 
principles. 
6. Democracies make better economic partners. 
As a capitalist nation, the US is interested in pursuing relationships with nations that will 
enhance the US's prosperity. In most cases democracies are politically stable and have strong 
market economies. Market economies, are run by citizens and businesses and must be free from 
government influence. Therefore, an economy may not flourish under an authoritarian regime 
where the economy is Wlder tight control. 
Several studies indicate that democracy docs not always result from US military 
intervention. For example, according to the Congressional Research Service report for Congress 
Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of US Foreign Policy?, the promotion of democracy has 
potential downsides. For example, democracy promotion can have a destabilizing effect on the 
entire country (CRS 2007, 10). During the transition process, the country can become unstable 
and susceptible to attacks from neighboring countries. A 2005 Harvard study stated that "our 
research shows that incomplete democratic transitions-those that get stalled before reaching the 
stage of fu ll democracy-increase the chance of involvement in international war in countries 
where governmental institutions are weak at the outset of the transition" (Mansfield and Snyder 
2005, 4). Ultimately, the authors claim that democracy promotion will lead to war and not a 
democratic government. 
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The Congressional Research Service report for Congress also contends that a potential 
downside of democracy promotion is the high financial cost (CRS 2007, 9). Foreign aid, military 
intervention, and diplomacy all require a substantial amount of money. US constituents are 
skeptical about foreign actions that are not guaranteed that a democratic government will be 
achieved. 
In Resolved: That the United States Should Intervene in Another Nation's Struggle for 
Democracy, Sidharth Oberoi contends that democracy promotion constitutes as an act of 
imperialism (20 11, 12). The author argues that US foreign policy makers arc invading other 
countries merely for the benefit of the US. Also, the new government will be devoid of 
legitimacy, as the government was forced upon them. 
On the other hand, there are also many studies which indicate that US military 
intervention is effective in promoting democratic governments. James Meernik conducted a 
study which examined why the US intervenes in the affairs of others to promote democracy and 
if the usc of force is an effective tool in promoting democratic change. The sample population 
consisted oftwenty seven international countries, which involved a U.S. military intervention. 
Meernik focused on tlu-ee time periods to analyze, which included 3- Year Pre and Post-
intervention differences, 3- Year Post-Intervention Difference and 1- Year Post Intervention 
Difference. Meemik codes the results as the following: negative changes are coded as -1, no 
change as 0 and positive changes as 1. 
Based upon his findings, Meernik contends that the US is interested in promoting 
democratic change to "bring greater stability in one's region and make it easier to influence the 
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targeted nation" (Meernik 1996, 392). Thus, the US is interested in more than promoting 
democracy, but also to gain the ability to influence a nation's policy. 
Also, Meenik found that U.S. military interventions generally do not promote democratic 
changes (Mccrnik 1996, 395). However, Meernik does argue that nations that have U.S. 
involvement have a better chance of moving towards democracy compared to nations that have 
not experienced US intervention (Meernik 1996, 396). There are many factors that the US can 
contribute to countries democratization. For instance, the US has the financial ability to invest in 
the economy of a nation to help economic development. 
As seen in table one, Meemik's overall results showed there was an increase in 
democracy one year post US intervention in the Dominican Republic. However, three years post 
US invention showed there was no change in democracy. Nicaragua showed there was no 
increase in democracy one year post intervention, with an increase in democracy three years after 
the intervention. Nevertheless, Panama showed an increase in all three time periods after the 
interventions (Mccrnik 1996, 396). 
The majority of the 27 nations studied had no democratic change at all. Despite 
Meernik's claim that most nations retain their current level of authoritarian or tyrannical regimes 
after a U.S. military intervention, there are limits to his study. First and foremost, his study only 
focuses on 27 countries. A larger sample must be used to achieve a more accurate portrayal to 
determine if U.S. interventions can result in a more democratic nation. Secondly, Meemik 
examines the democratic growth of a country only three years post intervention. Democratic 
growth is a slow process, especially if the country has no democratic history to leam from. 
Ample time must be given to a country to fully implement the democratic process. 
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Despite Meernik)s results that most of the countries retained their cmrent level of 
democracy, he contends that countries are more prone to democratic tendencies with US 
intervention (Meernik 1996, 397). Although these results seem contradictory, he clearly states 
"that when comparing the progress of democracy in nations which did experience US 
intervention with those which did not, the former group boasts greater movement toward 
democracy'' (Meernik 1996, 396). 
Therefore, my hypothesis that U.S. military interventions and coercive diplomacy can 
result in stable democracies are confirmed by Meernik's study. While US military intervention 
docs not lead to democracy is every situation, a country is more likely to experience democracy 
when it has experienced intervention, compared to countries that had not experienced US 
intervention. 
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Table l. US Military Interventions and Their Effects on Democratic Change 
J. Y car Pre and J. Year Post· J. Year Post· 
Post -I ntcrvcntion Intervention Intervention Targcl 
Year Event Description Diffcr('nce DiiTercnce Difference Nation 
1950 Korean War 0 0 0 South Korea 
1951 Security of Yugosla\'ia -) I I Yugoslavia 
1954 Guatemala Gets USSR Anns -I -I -I Guatemala 
1954 Tachen Islands Fighting 0 0 0 Taiwan 
1957 Syria Coup and Crisis with USA -I 0 -1 Syria 
1958 Invasion of Lebanon 0 0 0 Lebanon 
1958 Quemoy and Matsu Crisis 0 0 0 Taiwan 
1959 Laos Civil War I 0 0 Laos 
1961 Congo Civil War I I I Congo 
1964 Panama Riots 0 0 0 Panama 
1964 Fighting on Cyprus -I 0 0 Cyprus 
1964 laos Rightist Coup 0 0 0 laos 
1964 Congo Civil War 0 I -I Congo 
1964 Vietnam War 0 0 0 South Vietnam 
1965 Dominican Republic Civil War I 0 I Dominican Republic 
1970 Civil Disorder in Trinidad 0 0 0 Trinidad 
1970 Jordan Civil War with PLO 0 0 0 Jordan 
1974 Cyprus Military Coup I 0 I Cyprus 
1978 Angola Rebels Invade Zaire 0 0 0 Zaire 
1981 f:-cuadoriPcru Fighting I 0 0 Ecuador 
1982 Problems with Sinai Transition I 0 I Egypt 
1982 Security of Honduras l 0 0 Honduras 
1982 US Marines in Lebanon 0 0 0 Lebanon 
19&3 US Invasion of Grenada I I I Grenada 
1988 Nicaraguan Civil War I I 0 Nicaragua 
1989 US Invasion of Panama I I I Panama 
1990 Invasion of Kuwait 0 0 0 Kuwair 
n= 27. 
- I =Decrease in democracy, 0 = no change, I =increase in democracy. 
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Margaret G. Hennrum and Charles W. Kegley Jr. conducted a study that examined the 
success of US military interventions in promoting democracy. Eighty nine worldwide cotmtries 
which experienced US military interventions between 1945 and 1992 were used to test their 
hypothesis that military intervention can lead to democratic institutions. Sixty four of these 
interventions included some type of military commitment, which ranged from sending military 
advisors to deploying large numbers of troops. Twenty of these interventions, which is the 
control group, involved military personnel, but the intervention was not intended to advance 
democracy in the targeted nation (Hermann and Kegley 1997, 94). 
To determine if there was a negative or positive change to a country's democratic level, 
the mean degree before and after an intervention was measured. The Polity III democracy and 
autocracy scales designed by Ted Robert Gurr and Keith Jaggers were used to "assess the 
competitiveness and regulation of political participation in government, the openness and 
competitivess of executive recruitment and the degree of constraint on the chief executive" 
(Hermann and Kegley, 1997, 95). 
In the Polity III study, to determine the level of democracy, Gurr and Jaggers evaluated 
the country based upon their: 1 ): competitiveness of political participation 2): regulation of 
political participation 3): competitiveness of executive recruitment 4): openness of executive 
recruitment and 5): constraints on chief executive (Jaggers and Gurr 1995, 472). A score of 0 
indicated a low democracy, while 10 was considered a high democracy (Jaggers and Gurr 1995) 
472). 
The Hermann and Kegley study confirms my hypothesis that US military interventions 
and coercive diplomacy can promote democracy. The authors contend that US interventions have 
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more often worked towards enlarging democratic governments, rather than restricting democracy 
(Hermann and Kegley 1997, 1 08). 
Also, they state that "the purpose of the intervention, however, helped define the 
direc6on of any change that occurred, whether toward becoming more or less democratic" 
(Hermann and Kegley 1997, 98). For example, if the US government had a stated goal of 
promoting democracy, the US intervention was more likely to result in a democratic government. 
Hermann and Kegley focused on the time period directly after the intervention, which is a 
limitation of this study. To get a more accurate portrayal of whether or not democracy was able 
to withstand the test oftime, at least ten years after the intervention should be researched. 
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Table 2. Etiect of Reform- Oriented Interventions on Democraticness of Target 
Means and t· Tests 
Mean Mean 
N Before Arter p 
Type of Intervention 
Reform Interventio~ 64 ' -1.50 -0.62 L98 0.03 
Intervention Not 
Focused on Refonn 25 -3.20 -3.84 -1.4J ns 
Analysis of Variance 
s~mof Mean 
Squares df Square F p 
Between Interventions 
Type of Intervention 217.14 I 217.14 3.60 0.06 
Error 5242.98 87 60.26 
Within Interventions 
Change in Democraticness 0.50 1 0.50 0.09 ns 
Change by Type Interaction 20.63 I 20.63 3.94 0.05 
Error 455.38 87 5.23 
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Laos 
South Vietnam 
Thailand 
India 
Haiti 
South Korea 
South Vietnam 
Panama 
Cambodia 
Laos 
North Vietnam 
Dominican Republic 
South Korea 
Thailand 
Cambodia 
Laos 
1961 
1961 
1962 
1962 
1963 
1963 
1963** 
1964 
1964** 
1964 
1964 
1965 
1965 
1966 
1969** 
1969 
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1963 * 
1963** 
1963* 
1963• 
1963 
1964* 
1973 
1964 
1969 
1968 ** 
1975 •* 
1967* 
1969 
1975 
1974* 
1974* 
Laos 1973 1975 
South Vietnam 1975 ** 1975 
Thailand 1975 1975 
Cambodia 1973 ... 1975 
Guyana 1978 1979* 
Iran 1980 1980 
Nicaragua 1981 1988 
Lebanon 1982 1982 
Lebanon 1982 1984 
El Salvador 1983 •• 1989* 
Italy 1985 1986* 
Philippines 1985 1988 
Libya 1986 1986 
Honduras 1986 1988 
Bolivia 1986 1987* 
Guatemala 1987 19&7 
Honduras 1988 1988 
Panama 1988 1989* 
Nicaragua. 1989 1990 
Panama 1989 1990 ** 
El Salvador 1989 1991 
Liberia 1990 1991* 
Panama 1990 1991* 
Iraq 1991 1991 
Kuwait 1991 1991 
Somalia 1991 1991 
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Methodology 
Independent Variable: US intervention 
US intervention is not limited to the deployment of military personnel, the use of 
surrogates and/or supporting insurgents against the standing government. Intervention can also 
be economic, such as installing economic sanctions, cutting off fore ign aid with the intent 
to challenge and/or change the current regime and replace it with a govenunent more acceptable 
to the US. For this study US military intervention will include direct military invasion, indirect 
military intervention through the use of surrogates and/or threats of the use of the military such 
as "gunboat" diplomacy. 
Dependent Variable: Promoting Democ•·acy in Latin America 
Democracy is a term that is widely used in the political world, but many times is not 
completely tmderstood. There are many disputes as to what is considered a true democracy. 
Therefore, it is important to define democracy. For this research I will be using the definition as 
termed by Robert Dahl. According to Robert Dahl (Smith 2005, 8) there must be eight minimum 
requirements for a government to be considered democratic. These democratic values include: 
l. Freedom to form and join organizations 
2. Freedom of expression 
3. The right to vote 
4. Eligibility for public office 
5. The right of political leaders to compete for support and votes 
6. Alternative sources of information 
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7. free and fair elections 
8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of 
preference (Smith 2005, 8). 
Indicators 
For the purpose of this study, I will use free and fair elections, the ability of the 
opposition to win elections, freedom of expression, freedom to form and join organizations and 
the availability of alternative sources of information as indicators of democracy. Another 
measure of democracy can be determined if a party or group that takes power relinquishes their 
position and if the winners of the later elections turn over power as well (Huntington 1991, 266). 
Known as the two-turnover test, surrendering power is an essential part of the democratic 
process. 
On paper, a democracy can easily be written. However, a functional and stable 
democracy does not occlU' overnight, especially in a nation that has been dominated by a 
tyrrumical government for decades. It is a practice that must be continually nurtW"ed and allowed 
to take effect. Therefore, 1 will focus on twelve years after the intervention to determine ifthere 
was democratic change. Nevertheless, I will use a longer period of time in the case of the 
Dominican Republic as democracy developed very strong there. 
This research study will use Most Similar Systems (MSS) method to gather information 
regarding the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Panama. According to Timothy C. Lim, it is 
important when using MSS to compare at least two systems that share a plethora of similarities 
such as political, social or cultural qualities (Lim 2006, 34). Similarities in these particular case 
studies include US military interventions, all the countries were ruled by dictators and each had 
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slrong authoritarian roots as they were all colonized by absolutist Spain. Also, primary and 
secondary sources were used to gather information. 
Limitations of the Study 
As with any research technique, there are limits of the MSS method. For instance, 
examining a small number of cases limits the amount of information that can be gathered (Lim 
2006, 38). Therefore, one cannot make large claims from the small number of case studies that 
are examined. Another limitation of MSS is that no two countries are exactly alike (Lim 2006, 
38). Although countries may share many similarities, there are many differences that must be 
taken into account. Differences may include the culture, the economy of a country or if there is a 
prior history of democracy. Despite the similarities of the Dominican Republic, Nicaraguan and 
Panama, the countries are diverse politically, economically and socially 
Dominican Republic 
Political repression and lack of democracy increased in the Dominican Republic during 
the rule of Dictator Rafael L. Trujillo. From 1930 until his assassination in 1961, Trujillo 
severely limited political and civil rights (Crandall 2005, 48). To maintain control over the 
nation, Trujillo created his own political party Partido Dominicano (PD), which gave him the 
power to make all decisions regarding policy and maintain control. Additionally, Trujillo 
abolished all other opposition political parties and made voting mandatory (Hartlyn 1998, 43). 
With no political competition and total control of the military, Trujillo easily won reelections and 
remained in power. Actions by Trujillo denigrated democracy. 
Controlling information is necessary to maintain an undemocratic regime. Unlimited 
access to news sources, media and outside information threatened the survivability and 
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legitimacy of the Trujillo regime. The regime rightly assumed if Dominicans were exposed to the 
conditions and freedoms of other nations, they would chose to defect and live abroad. A mass 
exodus from the Dominican Republic would kill Trujillo's legitimacy both domestically and on 
the foreign stage. Therefore, Trujillo restricted incoming information by jamming foreign radio 
programs, censoring mail, controlling news media and only a limited number of Dominicans 
were able to travel internationally (J lartlyn 1998, 46). Also, phone tapping was not uncommon 
and foreign diplomats and journalists were under surveillance (Hartlyn 1998, 46). 
Trujillo's rise to power was likely due to the US's policy of nonintervention during the 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt ' s Good Neighbor policy. Regardless of Trujillo's status as a 
dictator, he understood the importance of good relations with the US. For example, he had forged 
good relationships with US military officers and leaders during past US occupations. More 
importantly, he also touted a strong anti-communist stance during the Cold War with the Soviet 
Union (Hartlyn 1998, 51). 
US attitude towards intervening in Latin American countries changed dramatically after 
the 1959 Cuban Revolution. Cold War fears in the US were reinforced when Communist leader 
Pidel Castro took control of the Cuban government. The possibility of Communism and Soviet 
Union power and influence spreading into Latin America was increasing. 
International pressure from the US and Organization of American States (OAS) resulted 
in economic sanctions against the Dominican Republic> which were instituted after an 
assassination attempt on Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt in 1960 (Black 1986, 28). In 
addition, the Dominican Republic was found guilty of human rights violations, which 
contributed to the economic sanctions (Hartlyn 1998, 70). 
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Trujillo's title as a dictator proved accurate. Public dissent was not tolerated and critics 
were murdered or jailed without trial (Herring and Herring 1968, 449). Trujillo's enemies could 
not escape his wrath on foreign soil as deaths or disappearances were not uncommon (Herring 
and Herring 1968, 449). Trujillo had to be removed from power. 
On May 30, 1961, Trujillo was assassinated by eight conspirators while driving outside 
of Santo Domingo. The conspirators had allegedly been supplied with weapons from the CIA 
(Crandall 2006, 48). Vice-President Joaquin Balaguer immediately became president after the 
assassination. The US used the assassination of Trujillo as an opportunity to gain more political 
influence in the Dominican Republic. To keep the Trujillo family from gaining power, the US 
supported the Balaguer regime. 
The Organization of American States (OAS) had a role in working out future elections 
following Trujillo's assassination in 1961. The Dominican Republican government set up a 
system of electoral boards to administer free elections with impartial personneL The Central 
Electoral Board, the highest board consisted of three members and was appointed to serve twelve 
year terms (Haggetty 1991, 140). The responsibility of the Central Electoral board was to print 
and distribute ballots, equipment and voting materials. All actions were to eliminate the 
possibility of fraud. 
The 1962 elections were the tirst held after the death of Trujillo and the first democratic 
elections since 1924. Democratic elections were held mainly due to the involvement of the US 
(Hartlyn, 1998, 78). Multiple opposition patties were active rather than oppressed. Juan Bosch 
won a majority with 58.7 percent of the presidential votes, compared to opponent Viriato Fiallo 
ofthe National Civic Union (UCN) who only received 30.1 percent (Hartlyn 1998, 78). The U.S. 
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showed their approval by supplying the country with $100 million in financial assistance 
allowing the US to influence public policy (Crandall 2005, 51). Despite the free and fair 
elections, Bosch was overthrown in a military coup only seven months after assuming the office 
of the president. 
In April1965, an attempt to bring back Bosch and to place the PRD back to power 
erupted in violence. A civilian junta, known as the Triumvirate, had taken control of the country 
after the removal of Bosch. Political instability ensued as former military leaders and party 
leaders planned to overthrow the Triumvirate. On April 24th, supporters of Bosch, known as 
Constitutionalists and civilian pers01mel overtook the National Palace and placed Rafael Molina 
Urena as president until the return of Bosch (Haggetiy 33, 1991). Lead by General Elias Wessin 
y Wessin, conservative military forces, known as Loyalists attempted to remove the 
Constitutionalists from power. 
Fearing the possibility of a communist takeover from the members of the 
Constitutionalists, US President Lyndon B. Johnson became involved in the violent civil war. 
On Apri1281h claiming that American lives were at stake Johnson deployed over 23,000 U.S. 
troops to protect and evacuate American citizens (Crandall 2005, 67). This action was known as 
Operation Power Pack. 
Perceived by the US as communists, Juan Bosch and the Constitutionalists did not have 
the support ofthe US during the civil war (Haggery 1991, 33). Therefore, in the minds ofUS 
officials, the retwn of Bosch would inhibit the possibility of a democratic nation. The US 
supported the Loyalists and after sixteen weeks of fighting, the Loyalists won. 
22 
An inter-American peacekeeping force (IAPF) was established to keep members of the 
Organization of American States (OAS) updated on the situation. To keep the number of 
American soldiers at a minimum, 1600 Latin Soldiers from Brazil, Paraguay, Honduras, Costa 
Rica and EI Salvador participated in the attempt to stop Constitutionalist from gaining power 
(Palmer 1989, 72) . The peace force made Latin American countries part of the decision- making 
process and gave the US validation for the intervention. 
The decision to intervene was based upon the "loss" of Cuba to con1munism and the fear 
of a communist Dominican Republic. President Johnson did not want communism to spread on 
his watch and was wilting to take the necessary measures to prevent it. A democratic country 
would help alleviate communist fears and prevent another Latin American country from 
succumbing to communism. 
OAS Ad Hoc Committee met with members of the Constitutionalists and Loyalists to 
gain insight for negotiating purposes (Palmer 1989, 88). On August 31 1965, major fighting 
ceased as Constitutionalist and Loyalist leaders signed the Acts of Reconciliation and 
Institutional act (Greenburg 2003, 5). Under this act Hector Garcia Godoy was placed as 
provisional president. To prevent economic instability and promote democratic change, the US 
provided emergency financial assistance to the poor, neglected country (Hartlyn 1998, 90). 
The 1961 assassination of Dictator Rafael Trujillo created years of political instability in 
the Dominican Republic. Juan Bosch, constitutionally elected as president in 1961 was removed 
as president during a coup (Cranda11 2006, 49). A countercoup was initiated to restore Bosch to 
power. Fearing a possibility of a communist takeover and the return of Bosch, US President 
Johnson deployed over 23,000 troops (Crandall 2005, 67). According to Russell Crandall, during 
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the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson there was a concerted effort to use the 
Organization of States to promote a political system and a set of leaders in the Dominican 
Republic who were supportive of an American model of democracy (Crandall 2006, 79). 
Jonathan Hartlyn contends the 1965 U.S. military invasion in the Dominican Republic 
had a negative effect on the possibility of democracy in the small nation (Hartlyn 1998, 89). 
National security, not democratic promotion, was the \Ulderlying reason to invade the Dominican 
Republic (Hartlyn, 1998, 89). 1be United States was more interested in stopping the spread of 
communism in American's backyard than promoting democracy. Therefore, a successful 
democratic structure was not seen as a priority. Jonathan Hartlyn contends that despite the 
attendance of prominent members of the United Nation (U.N.), Organization of American States 
(OAS) and U.S. ofti cials, the 1966 elections were neither free nor fair (Hartlyn 1998, 91). 
Despite what llartlyn assumed, the US was also interested in creating a democratic system. 
Nevertheless, Russell Crandall writes that the U.S. intervention was a key factor in 
bringing democracy, albeit flawed, to the nation (Crandall 2006, 94). Although Balaguer ruled in 
an autocratic manner, he allowed for a democratic process to evolve and for competitive 
elections to occur, despite his partial control of them (Crandall2006, 93). Two consecutive 
competitive elections demonstrated that the Dominican Republic were capable of moving 
towards a stable democratic nation. 
The 1966 elections in the Dominican Republic were the first elections to be held after the 
U.S. intervention. Fonner president Juan Bosch and Joaquin Balaguer of the Partido Reforminsta 
(PR) party were contenders for the presidential office. US supp01ted Balaguer assumed the office 
as president as he was voted into office by winning 57 percent of the vote (Haggerty 1989, 33). 
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The US hoped that Balaguer would restore democracy and political stability to the confl ict prone 
nation. 
Nevertheless, Balaguer ruled in an authoritarian manner where civil rights violations 
were rampant. While opposition political parties were legally allowed to operate openly, critical 
political opponents and journalists were jailed or killed (Kershaw 2002). Also, Balaguer had 
congress alter the 1963 constitution that enhanced presidential powers and removed term limits 
on presidential reelections (Hartlyn 1998, 1 02). 
Balaguer dominated the next twelve years as president and then was re-elected to office 
in May 1970 with 55.7 percent of the votes and May 1974 with 85 percent of the vote (Black 
1986, 51). Both e lections were largely won with intimidation. For example, although 
opposition forces were present during these elections, many refrained from participating due to 
harassment from the Balaguer controlled military (llartlyn 1998, 101 ). Additionally, only one 
million registered voters bothered to turn out to participate in the voting process (Black 1986, 
51). 
Soon after the 1970 elections, President Balaguer stated that "a democratic society has to 
resort to illegal and arbitrary measures if it is threatened by people seeking to bring about 
chaos" (Black 1986, 48). Censorship of the radio was introduced by Balaguer to further control 
the information that was broadcastcd. Balaguer also used violence as a method to remain in 
power. El Nacional , the Santo Domingo newspaper rep01tcd that there was 186 political 
murders and 30 disappearances that occurred in 1970 (Black 1986, 48). 
The 1978 presidential elections were an integral part of democracy in Dominican history. 
Balagucr•s power was slipping and he faced a viable opponent, millionaire Antonio Guzman of 
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the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRO) (Kryzanek 1979, 53). The competition between 
the two candidates would dete1mine if free and competitive elections were poss ible in a country 
that touted a democratic process, but lacked main democratic rights and freedoms. AJso, the 
election outcome would have the power to undermine or strengthen the US's role in present and 
future foreign diplomacy. 
Election Day was held on May 161h. Guzman had an early lead over Dalaqucr when on 
May 1 i" military units conducted a raid on the Central Electoral headquarters in the capitol city 
of Santo Domingo (Kryzanek 1979, 58). The objective ofthe raid was to confiscate ballot boxes 
and prevent the win of Guzman. This action demonstrated that the elections were still susceptible 
to tyrannical, military actions. 
On May 19111, US President Jinuny Carter validated the US's continued ability to 
influence the small nation by promising the withdrawal of US military and economic support 
depending on the "integrity" of the election (Kryzanek 1979, 58). President Carter's concern for 
human rights created an important change in US foreign policy. The pressure from the US 
prompted Balaqucr to a llow the continuation of counting the votes. Guzman received 50 percent 
ofthc vote compared to Balaguer's 41 percent (Kryzanek 1979, 58). Election turnout reached a 
record high with 75 percent of the electorate participating in the election (Kryzanek 1979, 58). 
August 16th Guzman was inaugurated as president in a historical peace.tul change of power. 
The 1978 elections allowed a new opportunity for democracy to flourish. Guzman 
restored civil liberties and basic human rights that were not found during the Trujillo regime 
(Black 1986, 54). Nevertheless, President Guzman had many political challenges. For instance, 
Balaquer's Reformist Party (PR) had a sixteen- to- eleven majority in the senate, which gave 
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them the opportunity to veto any of Guzman's bills (Haggerty 1991, 35). Guzman did not Jinish 
his term as he committed suicide in July 1982. Vice-President Jacobo Majluta assumed the 
office of presidency for 43 days unti I the May 1982 elections. 
The 1982 elections saw the PRD was triumphant again with the nomination of Salvador 
Jorge Blanco with 46 percent of the vote. The next viable opponent, Joaquin Balaguer received 
36 and former President Juan Bosch only 10 percent. The elections were fair, honest and 
competitive (Haggerty 1989, 142). Under Blanco's government, human rights violations and 
civil liberties were not violated (Haggerty 1989, 142). The elections were accepted by the 
general population and media as legitimate (Furlong, 2011). Democracy continued to thrive as 
freedom of press and speech improved under the new administration (Furlong, 2011). 
In Latin America, the level of democracy fluctuated from year to year. The Fitzgibbon 
Survey of Scholarly Images of Latin America detetmines the democracy rating of countries. 
Over the years, the survey requested ten Latin American scholars to rank the countries according 
to specific criteria to determine the level of democracy. Some indicators are freedom of press, 
free elections and government administration. The democracy ranking is coded as 1 presenting 
the strongest democracy and 20 presenting worst democracy. 
According to the study, the Dominican Republic was ranked 19 in 1955 during the reign 
of Trujillo. Aller the 1965 US intervention the democratic ranking improved to a 14. Democracy 
continued to improve as the ranking was an 8 after the 1978 elections. In 2005, the democracy 
ranking had remained an 8 (Fitzgibbon 2005). 
Freedom House, an online study, provides analytical reports and numerical ratings for 
196 countries and territories, which detetmincs their overall freedom, political rights and civil 
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liberties. The political rights and civil liberties categories contain ratings between 1 and 7 for 
each country or territory, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. The report codes 
the cmmtries general freedom as free, partly free or not free. 
According to the 2011 Freedom House report, the Dominican Republic's overall freedom 
is free, political rights and civil rights are all ranked as 2 out of7. This score indicates that, 
although not perfect and slow in taking form, the Dominican Republic was able to maintain 
democratic practices instilled after the 1965 US military intervention. 
Democracy improved after the 1965 US military intervention as seen by the ability of 
Dominican Republic citizens to participate in free and fair elections. For example, the 1978 and 
1982 elections in which President Balaguer faced a viable opponent Antonio Guzman. A high 
number of constituents were able to participate in the electoral process and freedom of 
expression increased as people were not afraid to voice their opinions. The elections allowed 
multiple political parties to participate in the campaign and electoral process, which was not 
allowed before the intervention. 
Since the 1996 elections, the Dominican electoral process has been seen as free and fair 
(www.state.gov). Freedom of expression and the availability of alternative sources of 
information have continued to increase. As mentioned earlier, Freedom House ranks the current 
political and civil rights 2 out 7. One being the highest scores possible and 7 the worst score 
possible. 
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Nicaragua 
Democracy in Nicaragua struggled under the Somoza and the Sandinista regime. The 
Somoza family first obtained power when National Guard commander Anastasio Somoza Garcia 
had Augusto C. Sandino assassinated in 1934 {Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006, 71). Somoza and 
his two sons, Luis Somoza Debayle and Anastasio Somoza Debayle held power from 1936 until 
1979 (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006, 71 ). 
During the Somoza reign of power, the infrastructure for democracy was only found on 
paper. To "legitimize" the Somoza regime, elections were held in 1936. Additional elections 
were held in 1946, 1951, 1957, 1963, 1967 and 1974 (Jonas and Stein 1990, 17). Although 
opposition parties were allowed to campaign, they held no true political influence and were 
unable to replace Somoza (Jonas and Stein 1990, 17). Elements of a democracy were 
manipulated to keep the Somoza's in power making it extremely difficult for opposition to gain 
political success {Tulchin and Walter 1991, 247). 
Support from the US helped the Somoza regime maintain power for over four decades by 
providing millions of dollars in much needed economic and social aid to the struggling 
Nicaraguan economy (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006, 71). The pro- US and anti-communist 
position of the Somoza family helped ensure the continued support of the US during World War 
II and the Cold War (Tulchin and Walter 1991, 246). 
Many Nicaraguans overlooked the abuse of power because the country was prospering 
financially. However, stronger opposition parties gained influence after 1974 when the 
Nicaraguan economy quickly weakened and constituents called for government reform (Booth, 
Wade, and Walker 2006, 71) 
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In 1974, Anastasio Somoza Debayle demonstrated his ability to inflict terror after a 
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) hostage taking incident. Thousands of citizens were 
assumed to be Sandinista sympathizers and murdered within a three year period (Booth, Wade 
and Walker 2006, 74). The Carter administration pressured Somoza to stop the tetTor and 
protests against the regime rose. Repression against citizens increased, which in turn drove 
thousands to join the Sandinistas (Booth, Wade and Walker 2006, 75). 
Under the Somoza regime freedom of speech was cut off. For example in 1978 Pedro 
Joaquin Chamorro, critic and editor of the anti-Somoza newspaper, La Prensa was assassinated 
(Moreno 1990, 51). The newspaper was closed down for more than a year during 1986-1987 due 
to printing anti-Somoza literature (Booth and Wade 2011, 177). The Carter administration held 
to their policy of non- military intervention; deploying troops was not an option for replacing the 
infamous Somoza (Moreno 1990, 57). Conditions in Nicaragua were suitable for a revolution. 
After gaining power, on July 191h 1979 the Sandinistas, with the support of the public, 
were able to overthrow Somoza. To maintain influence with the new government the US 
congress approved over $8 million in emergency aid and a long term package of $75 million 
(Moreno 1990, 63). New financial loans and emergency relief aid in 1979 to 1981 from U.S. 
agencies were also offered to the Sandinistas to extend diplomatic ties and gain influence 
(Moreno 1990, 63). 
The new Sandinista government promised to replace the Somoza regime with a 
participatory democracy and to hold elections before 1985 (Booth, Wade, Walker 76, 2006). 
Under the Sandinista government civil and political rights improved. A new Sandinista Police 
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Force and Sandinista Popular Army were established, which were used to prevent the abuses of 
power. 
After taking office in 1981, US President Ronald Reagan viewed the Sandinista 
government as detrimental to US national security because of their communist leanings. Despite 
the decline of power of the Soviet Union, Reagan was still fearful of communism spreading 
throughout Latin America. In an attempt to gain US public and congressional support, Reagan 
painted the Sandinistas as a puppet of the Soviet Union and therefore necessary to remove them 
from power (Carothers 1991, 96). 
Domestic opposition made US military intervention impossible (Cottam 1994, 138). 
Therefore, to force the Sandinista's from power, the Reagan administration financially supported 
a rebel group known as the Contra's. The Contras were primarily composed of the Nicaraguan 
Democratic Forces (FDN) and other smaller factions, such as Miskito Indian groups and the 
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) (Carothers 1991, 84). In 1981, Reagan approved a 
$19 million of covert assistance to the Contra's. Congress openly approved $24 million of 
military assistance in 1984 to the Contra's (Carothers 1991, 85). The CIA also supported the 
Contra's with intelligence and training (Carothers 1991, 85). The main objective of the US 
intervention was to politically undermine the Sandinista's and remove them from power. US 
foreign policy in Nicaragua was designed to remove the perceived threat of the communist 
Sandinistas from power by using diplomatic, economic and military pressure (Cottam 1994, 
130). 
Dming the Contra War, against the US supported Contras, the revolutionary government 
felt threatened and suspended many civil rights, including freedom of speech and began 
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censoring the news media (Booth, Wade, Walker 83, 2006). Freedom of Religion was generally 
free under the revolution, but the government was intolerant of religions that touted anti-
Sandinista rhetoric (Booth, Wade, Walker 83, 2006). However, with an upcoming election most 
civil rights were restored in1984 to gain favor with the voting Nicaraguans. 
As well as 1inancially supporting the Contra's, the US stopped the Nicaraguans from 
receiving loans from the World Bank the Inter- American Development Bank (IDB) and the 
International Monetary Ftmd (IMF) (Booth and Wade 2011 , 49). Also, the US reduced the 
amount of sugar imported by 90 percent from Nicaragua. These actions economically hurt the 
economy, but did not do the damage the US hoped for (Booth and Wade 2011 , 51). Nicaragua 
turned towards the Soviet Union for financial assistance and trade. 
To rally support from his US constituency, Reagan portrayed the Contras as "freedom 
fighters", struggling to bring democracy to the countTy (Carothers 1991, 1 00). Reagan also 
compared them to the US founding fathers and their fi ght fo r independence and democracy 
(Carothers 1991, 1 00). 
The Reagan administration's goal in Nicaraguan in 1984 was to promote democracy in 
Latin America (Carothers 1991, 97). Promoting democracy provided the US a positive 
justification while at the same time attempting to remove the Sandinistas. Reagan claimed the 
only way to a democratic outcome was through supporting the Contras (Carothers 199 I , 98). 
I have only 3 years left to serve my country; 3 years to carry out the responsibilities you 
entrusted to me; 3 years to work for peace. Could there be any greater tragedy than for us 
to sit back and permit this cancer to spread, leaving my successor to face far more 
agonizing decisions in the years ahead? The freedom fighters seek a political solution. 
They arc willing to lay down their arms and negotiate to restore the original goals of the 
revolution, a democracy in which the people of Nicaragua choose their own goverrunent. 
That is our goal also, but it can only come abo ut if the democratic resistance is able to 
bring pressure to bear on those who have seized power. 
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Ronald Reagan (www.rcagan.utcxas.cdu) 
President Reagan associated Commw1ism to cancer to portray the seriousness of the 
situation in Nicaragua to the American public. The term Freedom Fighters was important to 
describe the Contra's as those who wanted a democratic and fi·ee nation. 
Nevertheless, another clear sign of democracy developing was a high level of citizen 
involvement and the competition of seven different political parties running for the presidential 
position (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006, 81). Prior to the elections, the opposition parties could 
contribute input to the form of government Nicaragua could undertake. Among the components 
they wanted were freedom of speech, regular elections, freedom of the press and freedom of 
organization and movement (Reding 1985, 556). A remarkable 93 percent of eligible voters 
registered and 75 percent of registered voters participated (Jonas and Stein 1990, 19). 
Despite US support for the Contra and a trade embargo against the Sandinista 
government, Daniel Ortega of the FSLN party won the presidential election with 67 percent of 
the vote (Carothers 1991, 89). The next viable opponent, Clemente Guido Chavez of the 
Democratic Conservative Party ofNicaragua (PCDN) received only 14 percent of the vote 
(Carothers 1991, 89). 
The 1984 elections were deemed free and fair by the Latin American Studies Association 
(LASA 1984). Not all opposition parties participated in the elections, therefore they were not 
fully competitive. US supported Arturo Cruz and the Cordinadora Democratica (CD), believed to 
be the strongest opposition party, boycotted the elections due to conditions he deemed unfit for 
free and fair elections (Jonas and Stein 1990, 20). The Reagan administration sought to discredit 
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the elections and deemed them as meaningless and a "Soviet-style sham" (Jonas and Stein 1990, 
20). 
The 1984 elections were the tirst elections since the revolution against Somoza and 
fulfilled the Sandinista promise of holding elections. The Sandinista goverrunent cancelled 
restrictions on the press and granted access to goverrunent owned television and radio (Booth, 
Wade, and WaJker 2006, 81). During the elections, the Reagan administration strengthened 
efforts to remove the Sandinistas from power. A trade embargo was issued as well as $27 million 
in "non-lethal" aid to the Contras (Williams 1990, 19). In October 1985, the Nicaraguan 
government reestablished restrictions stating that "restrictions on political liberties were 
necessary as long as the revolution was under attack from external forces" (Williams 1990, 19). 
T~e 1990 presidential elections were an important step in consolidating democracy in 
Nicaragua. Nevertheless, the elections were only allowed by the Sandinista's due to the 
diminishing role ofthe Contra's in the civil war and the main agreement to the Arias Peace Plan 
( 1987), which called for an end to outside aid for guerrillas and peace taJks (Carothers 1991, 
I 04). The US was extensively involved in the election using $2.5 million of US dollars to 
strengthen the National Opposition Union (UNO) a group of 14 smaller political parties against 
the Sandinistas (LASA 1990, 16). 
The 1990 elections saw an increase in voter turnout of 86 percent, compared to 75 
percent in 1984 (LASA 1990, 34). The increase can be attributed to a stronger opposition party 
and conditions more suitable to free and fair elections. Additionally, opposition parties had 
increased television access, the unpopular military draft was revoked and the govemment 
granted amnesty to the remaining Sandinista political prisoners (Williams 1990, 22). The 
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govermnent allowed official observers from the United Nations and Organization of American 
States (OAS) to monitor the elections (Williams 1990, 22). The presence of international 
observers would help detect lraud and legitimize the electoral results. 
Presidential candidate Violeta Barrios de Chamorro won the elections with 55 percent, 
while Daniel Ortega of the FSLN received 39 percent (Booth, Wade, Walker 2006, 86). 
Chamorro was the first female to be president in a Latin America country. The deterioration of 
the economy, the Contra War and a desire for improved US relations hurt the rc·clcction chances 
of Daniel Ortega and the FSLN (LASA 1990, 40). The contra war and US economic sanctions 
damaged the Nicaraguan economy and infrastructure. 
The 1990 Nicaraguan elections were deemed free and fair by the Latin American Studies 
Association and President Daniel Ortega relinquished power peacefully to President elect Violeta 
Barrios de Chamorro. Prior to the elections, the news media was able to express a plethora of 
political information, providing constituents with access to unbiased material. 
The US officially recognized Nicaragua as democratic after the 1990 elections (Booth, 
Wade and Walker 2006, 171). During President Chamorro's nearly 7 years in o11ice, Nicaragua 
was more democratic, and elections were more competitive (Booth and Wade 2011, 177). 
Additionally, the government achieved major progress toward consolidating democratic 
institutions, advancing national reconciliation, stabilizing the economy, privatizing state·owned 
enterprises, and reducing human rights violations (www.state.gov). 
Repressed under the Somoza regime, the media gained valiant strides after the elections 
(Booth and Wade 2011, 183). Newspapers, TV and radio stations were able to express different 
political views with minimal repercussions from the govenunent. This allowed citizens to gain 
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information from a plethora of new sources that were not controlled by the govenunent, allowing 
them to form their own opinions. 
The 1996 presidential elections were the first post- Contra war and third consecutive 
elections since the ovct1hrow of the Somoza regime. The opportunity for opposition parties to 
participate continued; nevertheless the elections were primarily between the Liberal Alliance and 
Sandinistas (FSLN). Approximately 24 political parties participated; the majority of them under 
the Liberal Alliance (LA) led by Presidential candidate Arnoldo Aleman (Close 1999, 175). 
Aleman received 51 percent of the vote, while former President Daniel Ortega received 
38 percent (Booth, Wade and Walker 2006, 89). Ortega and other presidential candidates 
claimed the victory was illegitimate (Booth and Walker 2011, 68). 
In January 2000, Aleman and Ortega created a pact that would divide power between the 
Liberal Alliance party and Sandinistas, provide legal immunity for current or prior wrong doings 
and authorize new electoral reforms that would limit the number of patties that were able to 
participate in future elections (Allison 2006, 143). These actions inhibited the democratic 
advancements that Nicaragua had made. 
In the 2001 presidential elections, Enrique Bolanos ofthe Constitutionalist liberal party 
won with 56 percent of the vote compared to Daniel Ortega who received 42 percent (Allison 
2006, 143). Former US President Jimmy Carter, with the council of presidents, was there to 
observe the campaign and voting process deemed the elections to be free and fair as they had 
been in all of the elections from 1990 on. 
Shortly after assuming the presidency, Bolanos worked with the National Assembly and 
repealed the Aleman- Ortega pact to reduce corruption (Booth, Wade and Walker 2006, 91). 
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Aleman was later sentenced to a 20 year jail term on charges of lmmdering $100 million to party 
candidates and embezzling$ t .3 million for his own personal use (Booth, Wade and Walker 
2006, 91). 
According to the Fitzgibbons Survey of Scholarly Images of Latin American study, in 
197 5 before the revolution, the overall democratic ranking was 18. In 1991, after the 1990 
elections, democracy was ranked as a 10. Nevertheless, the democratic ranking fell to 11 in 1995 
and 2000 all the way to 16 in 2005 (Fitzgibbons, 2005). Freedom House indicates that 
Nicaragua's overall freedom is partly fi·ee, while political rights and civil liberties are both 
ranked 4 out of7 since 2011 (www.freedomhouse.org). 
Democratic advances include freedom of press and elections were considered free and 
fair. Also, the opportunities for opposition patties to participate in elections were greatly 
enhanced and those in power peacefully relinquished power. 
Despite the advances democracy in Nicaragua, the country eventually experienced a 
reverse wave in democratization and reverted back to a more nondemocratic government. The 
Aleman-Ortega pact of 2000 began to reduce democratic advances and by 2006 election with the 
Ortega victory the reverse wave became much stronger. Government intimidation and 
harassment of journalists have all increased under the Ortega administration making freedom of 
speech and press difficult and dangerous (www.state.gov). The Nicaraguan Supreme Court has 
allowed 011ega to run for office again, even though the Constitution prohibits a sitting president 
from seeking re-election (www.nytimes.com). 
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Panama 
Democracy in Panama was limited under the authoritarian rule of military regimes from 
1968 to 1989. Afier President Anulfo Arias was removed fl'om office for a third time after a coup 
in 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Omar Torrijos established a military junta (Furlong 1993, 19). US 
Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon and Gerald Ford supported Torrijos due to his 
anti-conununist and pro-US stance. In 1977 US President Jimmy Carter's willingness to 
negotiate with Torrijos gave the dictator some legitimacy. Under their leadership, the Torrijos-
Carter treaty was negotiated and ratified. The treaty scheduled the elimination of the US in the 
canal- zone and provided the transfer of the canal to Panama on December 31, 1999 (Sanchez 
2007, 153 ). Informally there was an agreement that Torrijos would oversee a transition to 
civilian rule (Robinson 1989, 188). 
Torrijos stepped down in 1978, turning over power to the Democratic Revolutionary 
Party (PRD) that he had created to maintain his ideology, which included nationalism and 
national sovereignty (Robinson 1989, 188). Unfortunately, the military remained largely in 
power continuing to repress the general population. Under the military dictatorship freedom of 
speech and press were curtailed and civil organizations were repressed (Furlong 1993, 20). 
The sudden death of General Torrijos in a suspicious plane crash in 1981 created a power 
vacuum in Panama that eventually placed General Manuel Noriega as ruler of Panama. Noriega 
took control of the Guardia Naeional (the military) and renamed it the Panamanian Defense 
f orces (PDF). Noriega had been providing intelligence to the US as an informant since the late 
1950's. Despite providing valuable infonnation to the Central Intelligence Agency, Department 
of Defense and the US National Security Council, Noriega was working as a double agent 
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providing Cuba with intelligence (Meade 2010, 301). Additionally, Noriega was heavily 
involved with drug trafficking, prostitution and money laundering (Millet 1988, 51). 
General Noriega did not usc terror and human rights violations to maintain his power as 
past Latin American dictators had. Instead political opponents were threatened with restriction 
on news media, economic pressure and the occasional arrest to install fear into his enemies 
(Millet 1988, 51). However, 1985 on he became more repressed and was accused of many 
human rights abuses and the murder of some of his political opponents. For example, dissident 
Dr. Hugo Spadafora publicly accused Noriega of illegal drug and weapon trafficking. His 
decapitated and mutilated body was found stuffed in a US mailbag (Sanchez 2007, 166). This 
was a warning to the US and others who were against Noriega. 
At the begilming, the Reagan Administration supported Noriega despite his 
involvement in electoral fraud and his support of the Contra war in Nicaragua (Meade 2010, 
301). Also, Noriega provided intelligence that resulted in the occasional capture of drug 
traflickers (Robinson 1989, 190). Although the U.S. had employed Noriega as an intelligence 
source, his continued involvement in the international drug trade, and his questionable 
involvement in fixing elections and his alleged involvement in the murder of Panamanian 
General Omar Torrijos caused the US to reevaluate their relationship with Noriega (Crandall 
2005, 189). Additionally, US government officials did not want Noriega to be in control of the 
canal when the US transferred all power to the Panamanians on December 31, 1999 (Sanchez 
2007, 168). US pride, hegemony and future influence in Panama was at risk. 
Two elections were held during the military regimes rule, which were tainted with 
violence and fraud. Opposition parties were allowed; nevertheless they held no real voting 
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power. In 1984, former President Arnulfo Arias and Manuel Noriega's candidate Nicolas Ardito 
Barletta were the two presidential candidates. Initially Arias won the election, but after the 
military altered the votes, Barletta was declared the winner and the Revolutionary Democratic 
Party (PRD) came to power (furlong 2003, 19). Despite the electoral fraud, the US supported the 
new government and increased military and economic aid (Perez 2000, 126). 
The Presidential candidate in the 1989 elections was Guillermo Endara of the original 
Arnulfo Arias party and his two vice presidential candidates Ricardo Arias Calderon and 
Giullermo Ford. Noriega picked Carlos Duque of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) as 
his preferred candidate. Despite excessive fraud, the exit polls conducted by the Catholic Church 
and the Carter Center showed Endara received 55.1 percent and 39.5 percent for Duque 
(Crandall 2006, 196). Noriega demonstrated his discontent by cancelling the elections and 
destroying all official ballots (Furlong 1993, 20). In September 1989, Noriega declared Francisco 
Rodriguez, whose name had not appeared on any ballot, as provisional president (Furlong 2003, 
20). 
The crisis in Panama partially stemmed from the inability of the US to remove General 
Manuel Noriega. Noriega was working as a double agent, providing intelligence information to 
Cuba and Colombian drug lords as well as to the US. Noriega's involvement in drug trafficking 
and harassment of US military personnel created the opportunity to remove Noriega. Economic 
sanctions and covert operations were not effective, which lead to the deployment of20,000 US 
troops. 
For nearly 2 years, the United States, nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have 
worked together to resolve the crisis in Panama The goals of the United States have been 
to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug 
trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaty. Many attempts have 
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been made to resolve this crisis through diplomacy and negotiations. All were rejected by 
the dictator of Panama, General Manuel Noriega, an indicted drug trafficker. 
George H.W. Bush (bushlibrary.tamu.edu) 
To gain the support of US constituents, President Bush used the protection of American 
I ives, democracy and the moral dilemma of drug trafficking to present Noriega as a threat to the 
American way of life and national security. Bush claimed that all diplomatic opportunities were 
used before deciding to deploy troops and there were no other options available. This 
manipulation of the situation was used to justify the removal and replacement ofNoriega with 
President Guillermo Endara. 
On December 16, 1989, a US marine was killed in Panama City. This action, public 
knowledge ofNoriega's drug trafficking and years of trying to remove Noriega from power led 
to US military intervention on December 20. US President George H.W. Bush ordered 24,000 
US military personnel into Panama to protect American citizens, the canal, apprehend Noriega 
and promote democracy (Crandall 2005, 172). Known as Operation Just Cause, the large 
numbers of US troops easily defeated the Panamanian troops. The US troops were able to 
eventually capture Noriega, where he was brought to Miami for drug-trafficking and money 
laundering charges (Crandall2005, 206). He completed his sentence in September 2007 and was 
then extradited to France where he is currently serving a 10 year prison sentence for money 
laundering. 
Aller the 1989 US intervention, Endara, Arias Calderon and Ford were declared the 
official winners of the 1989 elections and sworn into office in the Panama Canal Zone (Furlong 
2000, 34). The new government was faced with the challenge of installing democracy into a 
country that had been mled by a military regime for twenty one years. Although the 
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administration had won the 1989, they faced legitimacy problems because they were placed in 
office by the US military intervention (Sanchez 2007, 174). Additionally, the small nation was 
struggling economically after years of economic sanctions imposed upon the US during the 
Noriega years (Furlong 1993, 21). 
The 1994 and 1999 elections were "the freest and most competitive in the nation's 
history" (Perez 2000, 127). The conditions which the 1994 elections were held were significantly 
different from. previous elections in Panama. For instance, to reduce the amount of fraud an 
independent, nonpartisan Electoral Tribunal supervised the casting of ballots (Scranton 1995, 
88). Also, presidential candidates were chosen through primary elections, rather than through 
party leadership and a quota laws were instituted which called for a certain percentage of women 
to run for political office (Sanchez 2007, 188). 
Additionally, the US played a neutral role in the elections compared to previous years 
(Scranton 1995, 82). Historically the US had interfered in Panamanian elections to place 
candidates in positions that would benefit the US. A new political party entered the political 
scene known as Papa Egoro, which was founded and led by Ruben Blades. Overall, there were a 
total of 7 presidential candidates and 1 6 political parties that were able to participate in the 1994 
elections (Sanchez 2007, 179). The voters had a plethora of choices at the polls. 
An indicator that Panamanian politics was becoming more democratic was the 
willingness of incumbent President Guillermo Endara Ernesto to accept defeat and relinquish 
power to incoming President Perez Balladares of the PRD in the 1994 elections (Scranton 2000, 
113). Historically, leaders have been unwilling to relinquish their positions. This is a strong 
indicator that democracy in Panama is increasing. 
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After being voted out in the 1989 elections, the Democratic Revolutionary Patty (PRD) 
was once again a strong political force during the 1994 elections. The PRD, the party foWlded by 
General Torrijos was associated with the military regime. Many people feared that the PRD 
would not give up political power once they regained control of the government (Sanchez 2007, 
J 88). Weak political candidates and platforms acco\Ulted for the PRD victory (Scranton 1995, 
74). 
The May 1999 elections were also held without interference from the US. The democratic 
process was solidified in Panama by holding two free and fair elections consecutively. Tlu·ee 
presidential candidates and thirteen political parties were able to participate in the elections. 
Martin Torrijos, son of former leader Omar Torrijos and Mireya Moscoso were the top two 
presidential candidate contenders. Mireya Moscoso, widow of three time president Arnulfo 
Arias won the election with 44.8 percent of the vote, while political rival Martin Torrijos 
received 37 percent of the vote (Sanchez 2007, 190). Moscoso was the first female president of 
Panama. 
The International Foundational for Electoral Systems (IFES) mission declared the 
following assessments of 1999 general elections (lFES 1999): 
I. The electoral process on May 2, 1999 occurred in peace and tranquility 
2. The transfer of materials by the electoral tribWlal was conducted according to 
established plans and pennitted voting nationwide to open on time with all necessary 
resources on hand. 
3. As they cast their votes, in massive numbers from dawn to afternoon, Panamanians 
held a "fiesta democratic", marked by high levels of civility and an evident desire to 
participate in this exercise of democracy. 
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4. The transparence of the process was made possible by the highly professional work 
and conduct of persons at every level of the Electoral Tribunal, the Electoral 
Attorney's office and among the Corp of Electoral Delegates. Also notable was the 
extensive participation of Panamanian youth, who assumed the duty of statling 
polling places to enable others to vote, as well as exercising their own right to vote. 
Equally important and noteworthy was the patticipation of Panamanian women as 
poll workers and poll watchers. 
5. Tolerance, harmony and respect were the salient characteristics displayed by the 
political parties during the election; these attitudes facilitated the success of the 
electoral process. 
6. The continuing work of the Justice and Peace Commission in Panama's electoral 
process, as observers and through various Ethical Pacts, promoted and provided 
higher levels of tolerance and mutual respect among the actors in Panamanian 
politics. 
7. The role of the media of communication played a determining factor for promoting 
transparency of the electoral process. 
According to the Fitzgibbon Survey of Scholarly Images of Latin America, during the 
reign ofTonijos in 1970, the democratic ranking was an 11. After the 1989 elections, the 
democratic ranking raised to 15, with 20 being the worst democratic score. Democracy 
improved in 2005, the democratic ranking was a 7 (Fitzgibbons, 2005). 
Freedom House 2011 ranks the overall freedom of Panama as a free, while political rights 
is a 1 and civil liberties are a 2 (treedomhouse.org). These scores indicate that Panama was able 
to maintain its democratic govenunent despite many struggles to implement a democracy. 
For twenty one years, 1968 to 1989, democracy was severely limited under the rule of the 
military. Only two presidential elections were held, in which Panamanians were tmable to fully 
participate. After the 1989 intervention, Panama has held four free and fair elections. 
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Additionally new political parties emerged and freedom of speech and press improved as 
political opponents were able to express themselves without fear of retribution. President 
Endaras willingness to accept defeat and relinquish power to incoming President Balladares, 
indicated that democracy was prospering. 
Conclusion 
Democracy promotion in Latin America is a controversial topic in the foreign policy 
field. There is a continuing debate among scholars and public officials whether or not US 
military intervention can result in democracy promotion. Based upon my research, I conclude 
my hypothesis that military intervention and coercive diplomacy can result in democracy 
promotion is correct. 
Before the US military intervention in 1965, free and fair elections) freedom of 
expression and alternatives forms of information were all repressed under the rule of Dominican 
Republic President Rafael Tntiillo. After the assassination of Trujillo, Democracy continued to 
struggle under the rule of Joaquin Balaguer. It wasn't until the 1978 elections that democracy 
was able to nourish. President Antonio Guzman restored many civil liberties and basic human 
rights that were absent under Trujillo and Balaguer. After the 1982 elections, essential elements 
to democracy such as freedom of speech and press improved under the Jorge Blanco 
administration. 
Since 1996) regular competitive elections in the Dominican Republic have been held in 
which opposition candidates have been elected as president. Freedom of speech continues to 
improve as there are five national newspapers and there are more than 300 private radio stations 
and 40 television stations (www.freedomhouse.org). 
45 
Indirect US intervention, such as supporting the Contras and economically pressuring 
the Sandinistas, was implemented to force the Sandinistas from power. Democracy was 
solidified under the administration of President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. Following the 
elections, President Daniel Ortega peacefully relinquished power to Chamorro. Under the 
Somoza regime, freedom ofthe press was repressed. ALler 1990, the news media gained valiant 
strides as newspapers, TV stations and the radio were able to express many different political 
v1ews. 
Despite the democratic progress in Nicaragua, many other problems still exist. As 
mentioned earlier, Nicaragua has suffered from a reverse wave of democratization under the 
2006 election of President Daniel Ortega. Electoral fraud has been present in the 2008 municipal 
elections and the democracy that was achieved has been overshadowed by high levels of poverty, 
unemployment, crime and violence. Currently, Daniel 01tega has sought to build closer ties with 
Iran, Russia, and Venezuela (www.state.gov). These relationships could further damage the 
relationship with the US, as Russia and Iran and have access to nuclear weapons and Venezuela 
dictator Hugo Chavez has a vehement hatred towards the US. 
From 1968 to 1989 democracy in Panama struggled under the reign of military 
dictatorships. Under the military dictatorships of Omar Torrijos and Manuel Noriega, freedom of 
speech and press were curtailed and civil organizations were repressed. Also, only two 
presidential elections were held during this time. Both elections were tainted with fi:aud and 
corruption and were held only to help legitimize the leadership. 
After the 1989 US military intervention, the unofficial winners of the 1989 elections 
Guillermo Endara and his two vice presidential candidates Ricardo Arias Calderon and 
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Giullermo Ford were placed into office by US officials. Democratic practices greatly improved 
as the 1994 and 1999 elections were "the freest and most competitive in the nation's history" 
(Perez 2000, 127). In a historic election, President Endara peacefully transferred power to the 
winner of the 1999 election. Freedom of speech and press continue to improve as there are 
around 100 private and radio stations and several TV networks (www.:fr·eedomhouse.org). 
Through my research, I discovered that the success of democracy is dependent upon the 
leaders of a nation who must be fully committed in seeing democracy flourish. Effective 
democratic leaders are more concerned with the general well- being of the constituents and not 
increasing their own political power and influence. A good example of a leader not supporting 
democracy is Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega. 
I also discovered that economics can play an important role in the degree of democracy. 
During the Contra War in Nicaragua, the termination of foreign aid and loans had a negative 
effect on the agricultural system and overall economy. While the economy is suffering, the 
promotion of democracy is often overlooked. 
Additionally, different cultures can have an eiiect on the promotion of democracy. Every 
nation has a unique cultural background. Therefore, democracy should not be based upon the US 
political system, but should be established for that particular country. 
There is no telling if the democratic advances in the Dominican Republic, Panama and 
Nicaragua are solely based upon the intervention ofthc US. There is a possibility that the 
advances would have been made without military intervention or coercive diplomacy of the US. 
Therefore, further research should be conducted to determine if there are more variables that can 
influence democracy promotion in Latin America. 
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